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GEORGE H. WEBER
the whole array of people and agencies involved
in a case in any distribution of a memorandum or
message. Some of these conflicts over communica-
tion are reflected in the expressions of probation;
institutional and parole people listed below. A
probation agent remarked:
"We never hear anything from the institutions
about our people, how they are getting along or if our
reports about them are of much help to them."
An institutional worker said:
"I wish we would have known this about him when
he was committed to us. It surely would have helped
us avoid some of the mistakes we have made in dealing
with him. I wonder where this was held up. It's like
finding a hidden treasure. I hope it's not too late to do
us some good."
A parole agent explained:
"This report shows why the institution recommended
her for parole. This conclusion is supported very well
in their summary report; however, when you look over
the concrete description of the girl's problems and
behavior, the conclusion to parole her is not substan-
tiated nearly as well. This clouds the whole case. I
wonder if they have other pertinent information, ideas
or plans they haven't brought out."
4. AGENCY AND PERSONALITY CLASHES AND
STATUS STRUGGLES
Agency and personality clashes and status
struggles are interwoven in the conflicts between
probation and parole agents and institutional
personnel. Struggles over power, prestige, raises
in salary, along with the jealousies, envy and
hostilities that accompany such competitory
activity are included in these conflicts. Fears that
cooperative efforts between services might lead to
their reorganization and an accompanying centrali-
zation of an administrative control over them, or
infringe in some way on their vested interests
incites some agencies to remain at odds with others.
The subjective or personal aspects causing these
inter-service or inter-individual conflicts are often
masked behind other issues-issues which are more
socially acceptable than the personalized or agency
interests. Hence a worker or a service may not be
interested in cooperating on a particular recom-
mendation or decision regarding a delinquent or
an older offender made by another service because
such action would not be consistent with the
special interests of that service or the worker's
personal advantage. The struggle, however, will
not be represented in this manner. Rather workers
in any of these services may emphasize certain
negative aspects of the case or an issue in order to
achieve the unexpressed motives. At times, the
participants in these types of conflict are aware of
some of the underlying factors which influence
their overt behavior; at other times, they are not
aware of the latent motivations of their striving
and conflicts. In either case, they tend to defend
their supposedly reasonable position with logic
and selected facts which are based upon an unex-
pressed set of assumptions.
Some of these personality clashes and sthtus
struggles are indicated in the statements of
probation and parole agents and institutional
personnel. A probation agent, talking about
comparative salaries, said:
"Probation Agents should get a higher salary than
comparative positions in institutions. We have to work
more independently than they and have less resources
upon which we can rely. They, (institutional staff)
have a whole institutional staff and facilities to draw
on for ideas and support when they are working with
delinquents."
One service frequently attaches more import-
ance to their functions than to those of the other
fields. This is indicated in a remark by an institu-
tional person.
"I think every parole or probation agent should have
some institutional experience before doing their work.
They need it so they really know how people in insti-
tutions behave. This way you can get a real feeling for
these kids and learn how they operate in groups. Then,
too, there is something about institutional work that
you cannot appreciate or understand unless you have
experienced it."
A parole agent touched on some of the problems
of status and prestige when he commented on the
procedures of releasing men from prison:
"When it comes right down to it, it depends on who
(parole or institutional personnel) carries the most
weight on deciding when a man is to be released. Sure,
there are other things connected with the release, but
this is one of the most important."
CONCLUDI.\G REMARKS
The similarities between probation and parole'
and institutional services are usually viewed as
being positive in that the similarities provide
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SOME SIMILARITIES, DIFFERENCFS AND CONFLCTS
bases for common understanding and coopera-
tion. The differences between these services can
and do pose problems; nevertheless, these differ-
ences are often seen as positive in that they provide
for the division of work among probation, parole,
and institutional workers. Conflict, however, is
usually thought to be negative because of its
disruptive and destructive effects on the relation-
ships between these services. But some conflict
with the existing conditions. is a prerequisite for
change and can be utilized as a motivating force to
improve the inter-agency and inter-personal
relationships and professional services. Two cau-
tions, however, are in order. First, it is one thing
to work constructively with conflict situations for
their improvement and it is another thing to
exploit conflict situations for vested interest gains
or to make a worker or group of workers appear
inadequate. Second, it must be remembered that
solutions are rarely complete or final. They con-
tinually need revision. By working together in a
spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation,
probation and parole agents and institutional
workers can make conflicts an opportunity.
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INTRODUCrION
The premise that the juvenile offender should
receive treatment different in kind from that ob-
tained by his adult counterpart is agreed upon by
responsible members of the community in all
jurisdictions of the United States. The establish-
ment of juvenile courts in every state in this
country is evidence of this fact. Questions as to
what kind of juvenile courts we should have are,
however, by no means subjects of universal
agreement; basic questions here are: (1) which
juveniles should receive treatment from the
juvenile court and, (2) what sort of treatment
they should receive from the juvenile court.
The first question is a jurisdictional question
and is the subject of this paper. Related jurisdic-
tional questions, such as the overlapping of juris-
diction between domestic relations courts and
juvenile courts, the continuance of court jurisdic-
tion after the child has been committed to an
institution or other agency or has passed the juve-
nile court age, and jurisdiction over matters other
than delinquency, dependency, and neglect1 are
not here discussed; these questions relate, not to
which children should be brought before a non-
criminal court or institution, but to which non-
criminal court or institution should have authority
over children once it has been determined that
they should be subject to the authority of some
such agency. The question of the maximum age
jurisdiction of the juvenile courts is not discussed
directly, although it does fit logically within the
boundaries here outlined.2 This question merges
I Courts handling problems of delinquency, de-
pendency, and neglect frequently have jurisdiction over
problems of divorce, guardianship, adoption, physically
and mentally handicapped children, and illegitimacy.
COSULICH, JUVENILE COURT LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES, 42-46 (1939).
2 In general, this problem is suceptible to the same
kind of analysis as that here developed in relation to
delinquency, dependency, and neglect jurisdiction.
For an excellent treatment of the problem of the ado-
lescent girl offender, see TAPPAN, DELINQUENT GIRLS
IN COURT (1947). And, see generally, TAPPAN, JtvE-
NILE DELINQUENCY, 224-250 (1949).
with the problem of special courts for the adoles-
cent offender and would have swollen the already
large area covered by this paper beyond workable
proportions.
The attempt to answer the question of which
children should be subject to the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court is made through an analysis of
the purposes which the court is now attempting to
serve. Having determined these purposes, the
paper suggests an analysis of which of these pur-
poses the juvenile court is qualified to serve in
order to present an answer to the question of what
the scope of juvenile court jurisdiction should be.
I. TAE GENERAL SCOPE A PURPOSES OF
DELINQUENCY, DEPENDENCY, AN"
NEGLECT JURisDIcTIoN
Juvenile court statutes in the United States
typically designate three categories of jurisdiction
over juveniles: Delinquency, dependency, and
neglect. The delinquency category is focused
primarily upon the conduct of the juvenile; it
typically embraces actions which, if committed by
an adult, would be a violation of the criminal law,
and actions which, if committed by an adult, would
clearly not be a violation of the law, such as habit-
ually using obscene language or associating with
"thieves, vicious, or immoral persons."3 Depend-
ency jurisdiction and neglect jurisdiction, on the
other hand, are oriented toward the unfortunate
family circumstance of the child; in theory they
are differentiated in that dependency denotes a
lack of satisfaction of the physical and moral
needs of the child by the parent without parental
fault, whereas the parent of the neglected child is
culpable by virtue of his ability to provide these
needs and by his failure to do so.4 These descrip-
SmiTn-HURD ILL. ANN. STAT. c.23, Sect. 190 (1956
Sup.)
4 COSULICH, op. cil. supra, note 1. 42. For examples
of this differentiation, see Gen'l Stats. of Conn., c. 126,
Sect. 2802, (1949); Del. Code Annot., Title 10 e.11,
Sect. 1101 (1953). In some states. dependency and
neglect jurisdiction are not differenti.,ted by statute.
See, e.g., Col. Rev. Stat., c.22, Art. 1, Sect. 1 (1953);
JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION
tions of juvenile court jurisdiction will be refined
later; for present purposes, they serve to establish
the point that the typical juvenile court has a
jurisdictional base that extends beyond the violator
of the criminal law and embraces actions and
family circumstance deemed presently or poten-
tially injurious to the welfare of the child or
society.
The traditional rationale for this broad juris-
dictional base is the so-called parens patriae
theory.5 According to this theory, the child is a
ward of the state, and to the extent that his
parents fail to provide for his welfare, the state,
acting through the juvenile court, must so provide.
This theory has roots in the practice of courts of
chancery of providing for needy infants. Juvenile
court proceedings today are formally in equity;6
typically, juvenile court statutes provide that
proceedings are civil rather than criminal' and
that they are brought in the interest of the child 8
Thus, a child is not given a summons commanding
him to come to court; instead, a petition is issued.
He is not convicted a criminal and sentenced to
punishment; instead, he is adjudicated a delin-
quent (or dependent or neglected) child and
treatment is administered.9
Although the parens patriac theory may here be
conceded to account for existence of dependency
and neglect jurisdiction, it is clear that such a
theory will not do as an explanation for the court's
delinquency jurisdiction. Delinquency jurisdiction,
since it is based primarily upon the conduct of the
child, requires only a finding that such conduct
did in fact occur, and does not require a finding of
default by the natural parent."0 An answer that
might be suggested by the defender of the parens
patriae rationale would be that juveniles whose
actions place them within the delinquency defini-
tion have shown by their conduct that their natural
parents have failed to provide moral training."
Fla. Stat. Ann., Sect. 415.01 (1952); SmrTr-HURD
ILL. ANN. STAT., e. 23, Sect. 190 (1956 Sup.) (Appendix,
#91 of this paper.)
5 For a conventional exposition of this doctrine,
see SCHRAMM, Philosophy of the Jurenile Court, 261
Ann. Am. Acad. Polit. Soc. Sci. 101 (1949).
6 Ibid.
T ANN. LAws OF MAss. c.119, Sect. 53 (1949).
N. J. STATs. Axv., Title 2A, Sect. 2A: 4-39 (1956
Sup).
SRurniN. Protecting the Child in the Ju. Ct., 43 J.
CRrm. L. 426 (1952).
9 TAPPAN, Un,.ficial Ddinquency, 29 -NEB. L. REV.
548 (1950).
10 29 INDIANA L. J. 475 (1954).
1 In addition to the intellectual inadequacy of this
theory, there is danger of a misconceived disposition
But because this answer rests upon an absolute
presumption that would equate conduct within
the delinquency definition with parental default,
it is clear that in many cases this presumption
must be fictional; surely there are children guilty
of infringement of the juvenile court code whose
parents, at least in terms of the more immediately
visible indicia of dependency and neglect, have
not defaulted in their obligations. This explanation
is further unsatisfactory in that it would pretend
that the treatment administered by the juvenile
court to the juvenile adjudicated delinquent is
given solely in the interests of the child; that
essentially penal devices such as detention or the
"parental school" can be explained by this dogma
is disputed more fully in the following pages.
An explanation of the purposes of delinquency
jurisdiction can be made, however, that will square
with reality, or at least that reality perceived by
the planners of juvenile court jurisdiction. The
inclusion in the delinquency definition of terms
that apply to a child who knowingly associates
with "thieves, vicious, or immoral persons" or
who "is guilty of indecent or lascivious conduct"' 2
must be based on the assumption that such
conduct is dangerously pre-criminal and that the
authoritarian intervention of the state is "thus
called for.13 It would appear thus that the juris-
dictional basis of the juvenile court are motivated
by two separable purposes: the purpose of crime
prevention motivates delinquency jurisdiction, and
the purpose of social welfare service by the state,
traditionally labeled parens patriae, motivates
dependency and neglect jurisdiction.
The interest of crime prevention intended to
be served by delinquency jurisdiction is clearly a
if it is taken too seriously by the judge. "The legal
fiction that delinquents are like dependent and neg-
lected children in being wards of the state may often
lead to the placing of blame on the home situation and
the too easy assumption that if children are removed
from their homes and put in a 'good' environment, all
will be well." WITMER, Social Caseork in the Field of
Jure,ile Probation, 1941 NTL. PROB. Ass,. YRBK. 159.
2 SmriT-HuRD ILL. Axx. STAT., c. 23, Sect. 190
(1956 Sup.)
13 The courts have frequently acknowledged this fact.
In In Re Lundy 82 Wash. 148, 143, P. 885 (1914), the
court said: "The policy underlyin8 the act is protection,
not punishment. Its purpose is not to restrain crimi-
nals ... , it is to prevent the making of criminals. Its
operation is intended to check the criminal tendency
in its inception, and protect the unformed character
in the facile period from its improper invironment and
influences. In short, its motive is to give the weak and
immature a fair fighting chance for the development




social interest. It may be argued that the interest
is also an individual interest of the juvenile;
whether this argument is accepted would depend
on what is meant by the individual interest of
the juvenile. In a democratic society individual's
interest, for the purpose of determining when he
shall be free to do a given act without adverse
legal consequences, is deemed to be a freedom to
do whatever he is in fact interested in doing.
Where an action is deemed so inimical to the
interests of other individuals or of society at large
that the sanctions of civil or criminal liability are
applied, the fact of individual interest in doing the
act is not negated, but restraints are applied for
the protection of the supervening interests of
other individuals or of society at large. Hence,
from our perspective, the argument that the
interest of crime prevention is an individual inter-
est must be rejected; that this interest is a social
interest has already been acknowledged. The ulti-
mate question, then, is in what circumstances
the social interest of crime prevention justifies the
authoritarian action of the juvenile court upon
the juvenile.
II. CRIMINALISTIc INCIDENTS OF A DELINQUENCY
ADJUDICATION
Proponents of a broad delinquency definition
argue that proceedings are non-criminal and
hence that they are not to the detriment of the
individual adjudicated a delinquent. It is true
that juvenile court statutes typically provide that
proceedings are civil rather than criminal in
nature, 4 and that none of the criminal disabilities
shall attach to the adjudicated delinquent.12 But
the argument is deficient in that it overlooks
criminalistic incidents of a delinquency adjudica-
tion: the stigma of being branded in the public
mind as a law violator and the liability to authori-
tarian treatment by the court that is criminal in
nature.
The realitV of- the social stigma attached to a
delinquency adjudication is apparent. Even
though the process is concededly less stigmatic
than would be a criminal conviction, the fact that
in most jurisdictions he is labeled "delinquent", or
in some, has been given no label but has been
simply subjected to the courts processes and found
a subject in need of authoritarian treatment,
14 Note 7, supra.
I2 N. Y. CHILDREN'S CT. ACT, Sect. 45 (1952);
PURDON'S PENN. STATS. ANN., Title 11, Sect. 261
(1953).
gives him the status in the community of one
who has violated the law. The practical incidents
of this status are similar to those that would at-
tach if he were labeled criminal: social rejection by
those members of the community who consider
themselves law abiding, "denial of employment,
denial of the right to serve in the armed forces,"
and the fact that his "record" of juvenile delin-
quency "is included in a presentence investigation
for crime, although it is not considered a 'convic-
tion' in relation to increased penalties for repeated
offenders."' 6
The process of being adjudicated a delinquent
renders the juvenile subject to treatment sitilar
in kind to that received by the subject of a criminal
prosecution. Although he is commanded to come
before the court by a "petition" rather than a
summons, his attendance is presumably required.
The nature of the court proceeding is assuredly
very different in kind from that received by the
adult subject to a criminal prosecution, and the
informal non-hostile nature of these proceedings
is one of the outstanding attributes of the juvenile
court. 7 The fact remains, however, that the court
proceeding is directed at a fact finding as to
whether he did or did not conduct himself in a
delinquent manner, and the fact of the potentially
traumatic nature of the court experience is widely
recognized.' 8 He is subjected to the hazard of pre-
trial detention for periods ranging "from several
hours to a few months" in jail or jail-like struc-
tures.1 9 His delinquency adjudication renders him
liable to probation2 or to institutional commit-
ment. Probation is frequently referred to as "case
work in an authoritarian setting";na although in
16 Rt-Bi.\. op. cit. supra, Note 8, at 437.
17 A consideration of the purely procedural features
of the juvenile courts is, of course, outside the scope
of this paper. The problem confronted in this area is
that of maintaining the informal, non-traumatic nature
of juvenile court proceedings while at the same time
protecting the rights of the accused through the main-
tenance of at least minimal procedural norms.
"ABBOT. THE CHILD AND THE STATE, 336 (1938).
"NORMAN, DETENTION INTAKE. 1951, NAT'L PROB.
AND PAROLE Ass'N. Y'R'B'K, 140, 141. There does
not seem to be any consistent pattern of application of
the device of detention, even in the same state: "One
county will detain nearly every child picked up, while
another of comparable size and jurisdiction rarely
holds a single child in custody pending disposition."
(Ibid., 140).
20 Probation is the disposition ordered in the majority
of cases where there is a delinquency adjudication. In
1945, probation was ordered in 68 per cent of such
cases. TAPPAN, JUvENILEv DELINQUENCY, 333 (1949).
21 McGRATH, Casework in an A uthoritarian Setting,




its best forms it shares the therapeutic aims of
other casework, conditions are attached to the
delinquent's probation and for violation of the
conditions of probation the delinquent is subject to
further court action, including institutional
commitment. Juvenile institutions, despite the
euphemistic names frequently given to them and
the patches of ivy that may be growing on the
walls, are often justifiably known as "junior
prisons". 3
It is not questioned that pre-trial detention and
institutional commitment are frequently necessary
to protect the social interest in cases of serious
offenders. But is there danger of their application
to cases of less serious juvenile violators of the
provisions of the criminal code? Is there danger
of the application of these instiuments, or of the
less criminalistic though similarly authoritarian
device of probation to those juveniles who fit
within the language of those parts of the delin-
quency definition that pertain to conduct that
does not violate the provisions of the criminal
code?
III. PRESENT DELINQUENCY DEFINITIONS: AN
INVITATION TO CRIMINALISTIc TREATMENT
It would be well at this point to examine the
actual content of delinquency definitions2 used
in the United States to see exactly what conduct
they include, and to ascertain whether these
definitions are ever given literal application to
juveniles within their terms. Two general types
of delinquency definitions are typically used in
the United States.' The first type employs what
may be called the technique of specific enumera-
tion, and is the type most frequently used in this
country.25 The Illinois statute provides a good
example of the technique of specific enumeration;
-See, e.g., the institutional experience of (alias)
Sidney Blotzman in SHAW, THE NATURAL. HISTORY OF A
DELINQUENT CAREER (1931).
23 In a few states, there is no delinquency definition
as such; instead, jurisdictional provisions specify ac-
tions and courses of conduct fitting within the ordinary
delinquency definitions and family circumstances fitting
within the ordinary dependency and neglect definitions,
without giving the ordinary label to each type of pro-
vision. CA. W. AND I. CODE, Sect. 700 (1955 Supp.);
GA. ANN. CODE, Sect. 24-2408 (1955 Supp.); IDAHO,
LAWS oF 1955, ch. 259, Sect. 3. p. 603; NEVADA COM-
PILED LAWS, Sup. 1943-1949; Sect. 10383. The motiva-
tion behind this policy would appear to be to eliminate
the stigmatic consequences of a delinquency adjudica-
tion; that such a strategem can achieve this result may
be doubted. See STAND. J1-. CT. AcT (1949 ed.) Sect.
7, which adopts this practice.
24 See Appendix.
25 See Appendix.
it was enacted in its present form in 190726 and
has been copied exactly, or substantially, in many
jurisdictions. The Illinois statute provides:
The words delinquent child shall mean any male child
who while under the age of seventeen years or any
female child who while under the age of eighteen
years, violates any law of this State; or is incorrigi-
ble, or knowingly associates with thieves, vicious or
immoral persons; or without just cause and without
the consent of its parents, guardian, or custodians
absents itself from its home or place of abode, or is
growing up in idleness or crime; or knowingly frequents
a house of ill repute; or knowingly frequents any policy
shop or place where any gaming device is operated; or
frequents any saloon or draw shop where intoxicating
liquors are sold, or patronizes or visits any public pool
room or bucket shop; or wanders about the streets in
the night time without being on any lawful business or
lawful occupation; or habitually wanders about any
railroad yards or jumps or attempts to jump onto any
moving train; or enters any car or engine without
lawful authority; or uses vile, obscene, vulgar, profane
or indecent language in any public place or about any
schoolhouse; or is guilty of indecent or lascivious con-
duct; any child committing any of these acts herein men-
tioned shall be deemed a delinquent child and shall
be cared for as such in the manner herein provided.
'"
The second type has provisions of a generalized
nature; the Wisconsin statute may be cited as
typical in its provision that a juvenile may be
deemed delinquent if:
"(1) He has violated any state law or county, town,
or municipal ordinance; or
(2) He is habitually truant from school or home; or
(3) He is uncontrolled by his parent, guardian, or
legal custodian by virtue of being wayward or
habitually disobedient; or
(4) He habitually so deports himself as to injure or
endanger the morals of himself or others."
' 9
The generalized nature of terms in the Illinois
statute such as those relating to youths who are
26 See Appendix.
2Smrr-HuRn, Op. cit. supra, note 3.
2s Although the Illinois type of statute is here classi-
fied as one of "specific enumeration", and the Wiscon-
sin type of statute is classified as a "generalized" type
(by virtue of the catch all provisions of subsection t41),
it should be noted that, in addition to the terms tpc-
cifically enumerated in the Illinois statute, it also con-
tains such vague and generalized terms as "incorrigible"
and "growing up in idleness or crime". The significance
of the specific enumerations of the Illinois type of stat-
ute is that they sanction a delinquency adjudication in
any situation falling within the specific terms. See St.
ex rel Boyd . Rzitedge. 321 Mo. 1090. 135 W. 2d 1061
'1929) (dicta). and thc courts decision in In Re Lundy.




"incorrigible" or "growing up in idleness or crime",
and of the catch-all provision in the Wisconsin
statute relating to juveniles who "habitually so
deport(s) ... (themselves) as to injure or endanger
the morals of ... (themselves) ... or others" can
operate to deny the youth charged of a definite
charge of a particular offense. This defect is often
responsible for much of the procedural laxness in
delinquency hearings. Without a definite charge of
a particular offense, rules of relevancy of evidence
become impossible to apply; anything that the
juvenile may be alleged to have done that would
reflect badly on his character becomes "relevant"
to such vague standards. Without a specific charge
the juvenile has no opportunity to know with what
accusations he is charged and hence is deprived of
the right to marshall evidence in his defense.
Further, in states where a delinquency adjudica-
tion is appealable, his rights on appeal are diluted
since the vagueness of these terms is such as to
convey an indeterminant discretion on trial judges
applying them. 0 And where a technique of specific
enumeration of petty or minor conduct norms is
employed, as under the Illinois statute, law enforce-
ment agencies and the court can retreat to establish
evidence of these everyday "offenses" where the
evidence will not satisfy whatever requirements
the court may have for establishing violations of
the generalized terms. These dangers of wrongful
branding as delinquent conduct are multiplied by
such features of juvenile court law as the admis-
sability of hearsay evidence, the power to commit
to an institution after an adjudication of delin-
quency and a period of probation without a re-
hearing.3 and the failure of many statutes to
provide a right to appeal an adjudication, even
where a commitment has been rendered.3 The
30 TAPPAN, Treatment Without Trial, 24 Soc. FORCES,
306 (1946). This is certainly the case in jurisdictions
where the petition need only allege delinquency in
general terms. Jurisdictions, however, following the rule
that the petition must state the facts showing the
alleged delinquency might provide a specific charge of a
particular offense, depending on how seriously the re-
quirement were taken in practice, and on how specific
or generalized "facts" within the rule might be. See 31
Am. JUR., Juv. CTS., etc., Sect. 34 (1940).
31 Ex Parte Woodward, 92 Okla. Cr. 235, 222 p. 2d
528 (1950); Pet. of Morin, 95 N.H. 518, 68 A2d 668
(1949).
3231 Am. JuR., Juv. CTs., etc., Sect. 40(1940). Dep-
rivation of a right to appeal by the legislature is not
deemed a denial of due process. Wissenburg v. Bradley,
209 Iowa 813; 229 N.W. 205 (1929). Where the right of
appeal has not been granted by statute, relief from
improper judgements may be obtainable by extra-
ordinary writs. Ibid.
protection of the accused from the deprivaioas
of the right to appeal, and the right to a re-hearing
upon an institutional commitment after a period
on probation, and the admissability of hearsay
evidence cannot be obtained by amendment of
the delinquency definitions. But procedural norms
governing the relevancy of evidence, the oppor-
tunity to present evidence to rebut the charges
made, a more meaningful right to appeal where
this right is granted, and protection against the
substitution of minor offenses where more serious
fault is suspected but not established can be
achieved by delinquency definitions that include
only terms denoting particular conduct of a: gen-
uinely inimical nature. Because such terms are not
employed, and because these procedural norms
are thereby sacrificed, the danger is increased that
the juvenile who is not in fact guilty of serious
misconduct may be adjudicated delinquent and
subject to the authoritarian treatments entailed
by such an adjudication.
That generalized provisions in the delinquency
statutes confer a good deal of discretion upon the
components of the law enfoicement mechanism is
obvious and has been alluded to. They afford
members of the community' an opportunity to
register complaints to law enforcement agencies
about juveniles whose conduct may be conceived
of as fitting within these provisions; the police, to
whom such complaints may be registered or who
may themselves discover such conduct, are enabled
to unofficially "treat" such conduct or to refer it
to the court;n and finally, the juvenile court itself
is given a broad discretion in determining whether
a formal adjudication of delinquency shall be made
or whether unofficial treatment shall be rendered
in lieu of a formal adjudication. The specifically
enumerated provisions of the Illinois statute simi-
larly confer discretion upon members of the
community and the police in deciding whether to re-
quest court action in cases of conduct falling with-
in these terms, since unlike criminal conduct that
is immediately inimical to the social welfare,u
3 See Appendix.
314 TAPPAN, JUvENILE DELINQUENCY, 16 (1949). The
crimes of conspiracy and criminal attempt may be
justly excepted from the above generalization. Never-
theless, in a conspiracy, the conspirators are planning
an action that, if consummated, will be immediately
inimical to society, and the interest of preventing such
actions in their incipiency may be thought to justify
the crime of conspiracy in light of the above formula-
tions. The criminal attempt would seem more analogous
to the non-criminal provisions of the delinquency defi-
nition, for here the action is punishable because the
IvO. 4
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much "delinquent" conduct will instead only
provoke a response from peculiarly irritable mem-
bers of the community. Similarly, it is clear that
all judges will not adjudicate as delinquent every
boy falling within these terms so that the courts,
too, are in effect given discretion in deciding
whether to apply these terms.
A study by Porterfield provides good evidence
that the sources of intake to the court-parents,
offended individuals, institutions, and the police-
do in fact exercize the broad discretion tonferred
to report justified juvenile conduct or peccadillos
to the court3 5 Many of the instances cited of
parental referral to the court revealed clearly
unfit parents whose children had been reported
as "unmanageable" where the parent had sought
to impose irrational or excessive discipline. Court
records revealed parents who had appealed to the
court: "Keep him in jail for a few days, it might
do him some good," or, "Could you not send him
to the training school.... We have just enough
to eat and that is all." Many of the individual
complaints were petty and more revealed irascible
complainants than juvenile threats to the social
welfare. A case is cited of a girl who waspetitioned
to court by a male landlord on the ground that the
girl had cursed and abused the landlord in the
course of a dispute in which the girl had defended
her employer's right to hang clothes on a com-
munity washline. Other complainants referred to
the court such juvenile peccadillos as riding horses
without permission, getting fruit off other peoples'
trees, shining mirrors in peoples' eyes, hanging
around the pool hall until two a.m., teasing a park
attendant, writing obscene words in public places,
etc. A similar catalogue could be made out of
peccadillos referred to the court by private insti-
tutions and the police.36 Such cases, although not
providing the bulk of juvenile court references, do
not appear to be exceptional or only occassional.
In 1944 and 1945, of references to 380 juvenile
courts in the United States, "ungovernable" and
"running away" were the reasons for reference in
actor has manifested that he is a potential social danger.
Nevertheless, in a criminal attempt, the defendant has
attempted one of the very acts which, if successful,
society has labeled as so inimical to its welfare as to
render the actor criminally liable; he is merely an un-
successful criminal, rather than. as in the case of the
violator of the non-criminal content of delinquency
definitions, a person who has committed acts or fol-
lowed a course of conduct that, though non-criminal, is
deemed peculiarly pre-criminal.
35 PORTERFIELD, YOUTH I, TROUBLE, 15-22 (1946).
36 Ibid.
18% of the cases, and "acts of carelessness and
mischief" were the reason for reference in 20% of
the cases., It seems likely that the reasons for
reference in both categories were predominantly
for acts that did not constitute law violation.
IV. INCIDENCE or DELiNQUENcY ADJuDICATION4S
FOR Co,D-CT NOT VIOLATING
CRIMNAL NORMS
The cases indicate that such activities have been
adjudicated by the courts as delinquent, and that
in some cases institutional commitment has re-
sulted. In Hambel v. Lczine-s a juvenile was ad-
judicated delinquent because of his creating noise
in a moving picture during a performance. In
In Re Lundy39 a girl of seventeen who was em-
ployed singing in a restaurant where liquor was
sold was adjudicated as within the specific terms
of the delinquency provisions. What appears
clearly to have been an improper institutional
commitment is reported in State of Washington v.
Superior Ct., 40 where the sole basis for the delin-
quency adjudication and the institutional com-
mitment was a finding of reckless driving, without
the presence of evidence of other reckless driving
or of the juvenile's home life, and in the face of
testimony of his school principal that his conduct
was good. In another case (not reported in the
reporters because the parents of the boy agreed to
institutionalization and hence did not appeal) an
unstable boy found throwing stones at animals
in the zoo was held delinquent and committed to
an institution.4' It is not possible to tell by an
examination of the reporters just how frequently
adjudication as a delinquent for peccadillos occurs,
for in cases where institutionalization does not
result and the child is instead placed on probation
there is little incentive to appeal, and the parent
frequently cannot afford an appeal. Even in cases
of institutionalization, the reporters cannot provide
an accurate indication of the frequency of improper
3 RUBIN, The Legal Character of Juvenile Delinquency,
291 261 ANN. Am. AcA. POLIT. SOC. Scr. 1, 2 (1949).
's 243 App. Div. 530, 274, N. Y. Supp. 702 (1934).
19 82 Wash. 148, 143, p. 885 (1914).
40 139 Wash. 1, 245, Pac. 409 (1926). The institu-
tional commitment was reversed by the appellate court.
But what would have been this boy's fate if his parents
had been satisfied with the commitment, or if an appeal
had not been allowed? And. note that the case does not
indicate that the delinquency adjudication was re-
versed. so that he was still subject to the other au-
thoritarian treatments here mentioned.
" 11 U. or PIrr. L. REv. 281 (1950). citing Official




commitment, since in many states there is no right
to appeal and an extraordinary writ may not be
possible, or, even where an appeal is possible the
parents may be happy with the institutional com-
mitment and the child may not be aware of his
rights. The only thing that may be said on the
basis of research here conducted is that cases of
adjudication of delinquency for peccadillos and
cases of clearly improper commitment to institu-
tions do exist. It certainly can be postulated,
however, that delinquency adjudications for pec-
cadillos occur as frequently as irascible, moralistic
judges sit on the bench of the juvenile court and
hear such cases, and because frequently the juve-
nile court and hear such cases, and because fre-
quently the juvenile court judge will be no different
in his social attitudes than other representative
members of the community, it can be inferred that
the frequency of delinquency adjudications for
such behavior is disturbingly high.
V. UNOFFICIAL DELINQUENCY: AUTHORITARIAN
TREATMENT WITHOUT ADJUDICATION
A little less than half of the delinquency cases
referred to the juvenile court each year result in a
formal court adjudication of delinquency or non-
delinquency. The remaining cases are dealt with
unofficially; 4' at some point in the juvenile court
procedure before a decision is rendered, the child
is subjected to authoritarian but unofficial treat-
ment by the court probation department, or police,
or is referred to another agency, or is dismissed
without treatment. The frequency with which
these techniques of unofficial treatment are used,
and the given techniques of unofficial treatment
used, differ greatly from court to court. 3 Where
unofficial authoritarian treatment is administered,
sometimes it will occur by virtue of the police,
probation department, or other intake agency not
referring the matter to the court; sometimes these
intake agencies will refer the matter to the court"
' U. S. Children's Bureau, Jiv. Cf. Statistics 1946-49
(1951) report 58 percent of the delinquency cases in
courts reporting were handled unofficially. The 1954
report (statistics for 1950-52) reports that 57 percent
of delinquency cases were handled unofficially in these
years.
41 U. S. Children's Bureau, Jiy. Ct. Statistics:
1946-49. Different courts reflect practices of unofficial
treatment running the spectrum from 22 percent of
cases (Pennsylvania courts) to 96 percent of cases
(Hamilton County, Ohio).
44 HALL, Limiting Unofficial Casework, 1951 NAT'L
PROB. AND PAROLE Ass'N Y'R'B'K, 84, reports that
the Bureau of Adjustment, New York City's intake
agency, referred 24.7 percent of its cases to the juvenile
court.
and the judge, after hearing the case, will "hold a
decision in abeyance during the child's good be-
havior, with the implicit or explicit threat of ad-
judication in the event of his (the boy's) failure to
cooperate." 45 Authoritarian treatments that may
be administered, in addition to a simple warning
by the judge, include unofficial probation and an
occasional dose of detention rendered under the
theory that the boy could profit by a shock.4 6 It is
likely that such unofficial treatment is typically
applied to the less serious forms of juvenile conduct
within the delinquency definition;47 however, since
this practice is not explicitly authorized by the
juvenile court statutes and no statutory norms are
established, there is no assurance that such a dis-
crimination is made. Hence, the intake officer is
given the same free reign of discretion in referring
these cases to the judge as is the judge in disposing
of them. And, of course, the fact that the juvenile
who commits a minor offense may not be officially
treated by court order is no defense of the broad
scope of delinquency jurisdiction; although such
treatment is better than the egregious case of an
institutional commitment being founded on such
a case, the instances of unofficial detention, or
even of authoritarian treatment through unofficial
probation or a court appearance with a warning
by the judge constitute a real interference with
the individual's freedom.
VI. THE ASSUMPTION OF PRE-CRIMINALITY
Our previous analysis has shown that the justi-
fication for delinquency jurisdiction is the social
interest of crime prevention. Delinquency defini-
tions, then, must rest upon the assumption that
their terms embrace conduct which provides solid
evidence of pre-criminality. 3
Studies of recidivism among delinquents coming
into contact with the courts are based upon sam-
ples of juveniles who were brought into court for
serious offenses. They provide incontrovertible
4 TAPPAN, op. cit. supra, note 9.
11 Ibid.
47 LINDEMAN, op. cit. supra, note 33, reports at 128
that under the system used in Essex County, New
Jersey, the following types of cases are typically dis-
posed of without court action: "acting in a disorderly
manner, habitual vagrancy, incorrigibility, growing up
in idleness or delinquency, knowingly visiting or patron-
izing gambling places, idly roaming the streets at
night, family conflicts, and neighborhood scraps."
NEARY, in 1936 NAT'L PROB. Ass'N. Y'RB'K, 209, re-
ports that a similar practice is followed in Cleveland
juvenile courts.
" TAPPAN, DELINQUENT GIRLs IN COURT, 101 (1947).
SUTHERLAD and CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMI-
NOLOGY, 402 (1955 ed.).
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evidence that juveniles who commit serious offenses
recidivate to an alarming extent,4 9 but, of course,
they do not prove the extent of recidivism amrong
non-serious juvenile offenders. There do not appear
to be any studies of post-juvenile court subjects
who committed minor offenses. A study by Porter-
field of the pre-college delinquent conduct of college
students in northern Texas showed that all the
college students, both men and women, reported
that they had committed acts of the kind for
which delinquency charges had been made against
children.50 This study is no more than a verifica-
tion of the immediately apparent fact that pre-
college, as well as pre-criminal, juveniles frequently
indulge in petty acts of malicious mischief and
vagabondage.
The petty act of malicious mischief, or vaga-
bondage, then, is but a symptom of the child's
total personality:" it may, on deeper examination,
be consistent with a personality structure, family
background, and associations strongly indicative
of precriminality; it may, on the other hand, in the
light of more favorable factors of personality struc-
ture, family background, and associations, be con-
sistent with an interpretation of social normality.
In the more enlightened courts, of course, the
techniques of social investigation and clinical
examination are employed; in these courts, the
court's action is based on more solid evidence of
pre-criminality than the act alone. But in many
jurisdictions, such facilities are not available. The
court probably does not have clinical facilities at
its command, and if a social investigation is made
by a probation officer, he probably lacks the train-
ing and insight to make an accurate forecast of
pre-criminality.
VII. Tr UNWISDOM OF AUTHORITARIAN TREAT-
MENT OF THE NOMINAL DELINQUENT, EvEN
WHERE THE ASSUMhPTION OF PRE-CRIMINALITY
Is WELL FOUNED
The more difficult question, of course, is pre-
sented where it is assumed that the court has a
personnel and resources with which it can make a
reliable estimate of pre-criminality; its judge is
well versed in the philosophy that the act alone is
but a symptom, the probation department is
manned by workers thoroughly skilled in the
techniques of pre-trial examination, and a clinic
is used regularly that employs capably the best of
49 See note 56, infra.
so PORTERFIELD, op. cit. supra, note 38.
51 YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND
DELINQUENCY, 14 (1952 ed.).
predictive techniques. 2 At this point, may it not
be argued that the court's broad delinquency
jurisdiction is justified on the ground that it has
served the function of bringing to the attention of
the court a large portion of the possibly pre-
criminal population, and from this population the
court has selected those whom reliable predictive
devices indicate have a high likelihood of future
criminality for rehabilitative treatment?
A partial answer to this question has already
been indicated. Our concept of justice requires
that before a person is exposed to the stigmatic
and punitive consequences of an adjudication of
social wrongdoing, his conduct must have been
sufficiently inimical to the social welfare to justify
such consequences and he must be given procedural
protection so that a finding that such conduct did
in fact occur will be reliable. A delinquency adjudi-
cation, it has been shown, is stigmatic and does
involve such possible punitive or authoritarian
consequences as detention and institutional com-
mitment or probation. Much of the conduct legally
sanctioning such consequences is not sufficiently
inimical to the social welfare to justify these con-
sequences under the theory here set forth; more-
over, the procedural rules governing the juvenile
court, both by virtue of the very looseness of the
delinquency definition and other factors alluded to,
are not such as will guarantee a sufficiently reliable
adjudication of wrongful conduct. But suppose the
question is framed in still more difficult terms:
suppose our court not only follows sound predictive
policies, but that it follows sound legal policies as
well. It follows procedural norms as consistent with
the goal of informality as is possible to insure non-
traumatic and fair fact finding. We are assuming
that our subject has been brought into the court
for non-serious conduct violative of the delin-
quency definition; our enlightened court will not
hold him in detention, because he has not demon-
strated that he constitutes a danger to the social
welfare; it will put him on probation rather than
commit him to an institution.
We might make our subject more concrete.
Suppose he is a fourteen year old who has fre-
quented the neighborhood pool hall on several
52 See, e.g., prediction tables developed in S. and E.
GLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1950).
For a report of validations of the Glueck's prediction
tables, see WHELAN, An Experiment in Predicting De-
linquency, 45 J. CRIM. LAW, 432 (1954). For a report of
validation of attitude-interest tests as a predictive de-
vice, see Dr'REA, The DifTerential Diagnosis of Potential




evenings and on this particular evening there is
shooting pool with an older and somewhat dis-
reputable person at eleven-thirty. The manager of
the pool hall, responding to a latent social con-
science and the urge to exercize his authority,
shouts at the boy, "Come on punk, it's time kids
like you was home in bed." At this point, the
policeman strolls in. He seconds the proprietor's
promptings, but our juvenile is resentful and curses
the proprietor in a shocking round of four letter
words; he insists to the policeman that he is going
to finish his game. At this point, the policeman,
frustrated by the rebuke to his authority and feel-
ing a paternalistic urge to have the juvenile court
treat the boy, takes him to the police station, after
which he is petitioned to appear in juvenile court.
Sound predictive techniques applied in the pre-
hearing investigation reveal that the boy has a
dangerous potential for criminality, and he is
adjudicated a delinquent, as he clearly could be
under the specific language of the Illinois statute
and the generalized language of the Wisconsin
statute. Should probation be applied? An affirma-
tive answer rests upon the assumptions, first, that
the boy's conduct justified the authoritarian treat-
ment he has received and the stigma attached to
his delinquency adjudication, and second, that the
court's probation work will be genuinely rehabilita-
tive and will arrest the tendency to pre-criminalify
found to exist in the boy.
Objection to the first assumption has already
been indicated. It is the second assumption, that
probation will here be rehabilitative, that must
now be examined.
Probation, as was stated earlier, has sometimes
been referred to as casework in an authoritarian
setting. That the setting is authoritarian is not to
be questioned; what is to be questioned is whether
it can serve the ends of non-authoritarian case-
work. All agree that a necessary condition prec-
edent to successful probation is a rapport relation-
ship between caseworker and client.u It seems
doubtful that this can be achieved in the authori-
tarian setting of probation. Our subject is hostile
and resentful to the probation officer. He has
received what he conceives to be wrongful and
unjustified treatment by the police and court.
His conditions of probation are that he must stay
away from pool halls and eschew corrupting influ-
ences. The probation officer checks with the pro-
prietor of the pool hall to make sure that our
5 CHERRY, The Probation Officer on the Job, 1945
NT'L PROB. Ass'N YRBK., 195.
subject stays away; the proprietor is co-operative
because he is antagonistic now to the "wise delin-
quent punk." The probation officer cannot be the
friend of the delinquent; he is exercizing surveil-
lance to make sure that the conditions of proba-
tion are fulfilled. The delinquent resents his required
visits with the probation officerAu The essential
condition of rapport is defeated.
This is not to categorically condemn the authori-
tarian aspects of court treatment. It all depends
on to whom they are applied.5 5 Follow-up studies
of the after careers of serious juvenile offenders
uniformly show that the court cannot hope for a
high degree of success with the youth who is al-
ready seriously delinquent. 56 Nevertheless, no
other technique has demonstrated success; until
this happens it would seem that we must follow
the common sense assumption that the youth
whose conduct violates fundamental social norms
must, if possible, be educated to the reality that
the community has authority to apply sanctions
against such behavior. Because this authority is
thus assumed to be necessary in these cases, a
compromise must be made with the other desid-
erata of casework. In the case of the nominal de-
linquent, however, there is no occasion to exercise
such authority; because his behavior has not par-
taken of the culpable qualtites that require aware-
ness of authority, it will not perform an educational
function but will only serve to confuse and depre-
ciate whatever respect for authority he may have
had.
In our case of the delinquent poolplayer, whom
investigation showed to have a high probability
of future criminality, it is likely that the best oc-
casion for genuinely crime-preventive measures
to have been applied would have been in his child-
5
' KAWIN, Legal Handicaps in Juvenile Casework,
1937 NAT'L PROB. AND PAROLE Ass'N YRBK., 188.
5 5
BERKMAN, RAPPAPORT, AND SULZBERGER, Thera-
peutic E'ects of an Authoritarian Setting in Children's
Courts, 9 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY, 347 (1939).
56 S. and E. GLUEcK, ONE THOUSAND JUVENILE DE-
LINQUENTS, 151 (1934) showed that 88.2 percent of the
delinquents studied recidivated within five years. The
youths here studied were serious offenders; more than
two-thirds of them had committed serious property
offenses (p. 100). MERRIL, PROBLEMS OF CHI.D DE-
LINQUENcY, 292 (1947) reports 47.9 percent recidivism
among three hundred offenders, the majority of whom
appear to have been serious offenders (Appendix B,
Table 2, p. 396). HEALY and BRONNER, DELINQUENTS
AND CRIMINALS 245 (1928) report 61 percent recidivism
in a group of 420 Chicago boy offenders; again the sub-
jects studied were serious offenders (pp. 12-16). These
studies establish beyond doubt that sanguine expecta-
tions about the court's ability to transform serious
offenders into law abiding citizens are mistaken.
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hood at the age when these tendencies were first
observable and his attitudes and behavior patterns
were sufficiently uncrystalized to be amenable to
therapeutic treatment.Y The most promising
methods of crime prevention, then, lie in the de-
velopment of community resources capable of
detecting and treating the potential criminal at an
early age. Where violations of fundamental social
norms occur at a later juvenile age, authority
must be applied, but this is, at best, a second line
of defense.
VIII. COmmuNITy WELFARE AGENCIES: THE
DESIRED AGENCY FOR TREATMENT OF
TnE NoMINAL DELINQUENT
The typical juvenile court, of course, does not
participate fully in the utopian features of the
court described in the case of the juvenile pool-
player. Typically, its judge is a political appointee,
and he may rotate from court to court, not even
specializing in juvenile court work.M Its probation
department is typically understaffed; 59 a good
part of the fault here is due to the assumption of
casework occasioned by bloated delinquency defi-
nitions and dependency and neglect jurisdiction."
Would it not be better for the juvenile court to
surrender its jurisdiction over juveniles whose
conduct has not violated basic community norms?
The solution would be for welfare agencies in the
community, that can do casework without the
disadvantages of an authoritarian setting, to as-
sume this task;"' these juveniles, under our hy-
pothesis, do not require an authoritarian setting
and, indeed, should not be placed under one. Their
personnel would be genuinely trained for juvenile
casework, as is frequently not the case with pro-
bation officers. The community would be more
ready to submit cases to these agencies, because
despite the fiction of parens patriae, it conceives
of juvenile delinquents as law violaters and is often
reluctant to send cases to the juvenile court. 2
s7 S. and E. GLUECK, UNRAVELING JuvENILE DE-
LINQUENCY (1950).
u KILLIAN, The Juv. C1. as an Instittion, 261 ANN.
AM. ACAD. PoLIT. Soc. Sci., 89 (1949).9T In CooLEY, PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY, (1927)
it is reported that in New York State home visits to
delinquent probationers averaged less than eight per
year and lasted for from ten to fifteen minutes.
60 HANNA, Dependency and Neglect Cases in the Juv.
Ct., 1941 NT'L PROB. AND PAROLE Ass'N YRBx., 136,
152.
61 NuTr, Juvenile Court Function, 1946 NT'L PROB.
AsS'N. YRB., 94 (1942).
6 NuTT, The Future of the Juv. Ct. as a Case',york
Agency, 1939 NT'L PROB. AND PAROLE Ass'N, YRBK.,
157, 161.
The non-serious offender would not be subject to
the dangers already mentioned; in addition, it
may be pointed out that in this process he is ex-
posed to the risk of contact with the seriously
delinquent and to a treatment process that sym-
bolically represents to him that his lot is cast with
the "outs" in the community.Y
Two problems must be encountered before we
finally determine that the broad scope of delin-
quency definitions is totally without justification.
The first is that in many communities a wise sys-
tem of intake is employed whereby the youth who
has conducted himself in a non-serious manner
violative of the delinquency statute is not brought
before the court but is instead referred immediately
to other agencies in the community; thus, our
juvenile poolplayer would never have received
court treatment or probation but would have been
referred initially to other agencies in the com-
munity. This intake technique has already been
described in the earlier material on unofficial treat-
ment. The dangers there described sufficiently
answer the argument for self-limitation by intake;
it seems unreasonable to presume that the dis-
cretion here conferred will be exercized wisely in
all juvenile courts in a given state. Assuming,
however, that such a measure of discretion is ex-
ercised, or that a reasonably close approximation
of such discretion is exercized, has not the intake
system of self-limitation the merit of being able
to bring the resources of the community to a large
number of persons by virtue of the broadness of
the delinquency definition? The answer is that
this possible gain in subjects for welfare service
treatment is offset by the fact of reluctance of
many members of the communty to refer juveniles-
to the court or to the police.
The second problem is that in many communities
such non-authoritarian welfare agencies do not
exist. Hence, there is no alternative here to au-
thoritarian treatment; either the court deals with
the juvenile who is guilty of a minor violation of
the delinquency statute, or he will receive no
treatment at all. The answer to this problem has
already been suggested: in view of the dangers of
court treatment and, at best, its nominal effective-
ness, the preferred solution in this case is that the
juvenile receive no treatment at all.
IX. A SUGGESTED DELINQENCY DEFINITIO\J
Having decided, then, that the delinquency
jurisdiction should be narrowed to exclude from
63 SHAW, op. cit. supra, note 22, 228.
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court contact the juvenile whose conduct has
violated non-serious portions of present juvenile
court delinquency proviV-',. how, specifically,
should the delinquency delinniun be changed? The
answer suggested by the analysis already presented
would be that the appropriate content of the
delinquency definition should be the violation of
any state law, or county, town, or municipal or-
dinance. The violation of such laws, by definition,
is conduct sufficiently inimical to the social welfare
to justify the state in applying sanctions against
the offender; moreover, most of these terms are
sufficiently definite to avoid the defect of not
providing the offender with a specific charge of a
definite offense. Such provision, of course, cannot
completely protect against abuse of discretion by
the law enforcement system; the child who spits
on the sidewalk, or, more realistically, who en-
gages in a petty first and only theft with some
companions, is still amenable to the court's process.
However, some degree of discretionary applica-
tion is inherent in any system of law; the gain here
is that it is cut down to tolerable proportions.
Moreover, since the law of the community is an
authoritarian fact with which the juvenile ml'st
learn to live for his entire life, assuming that a fair
amount of discretion is applied in ordering treat-
ment, the juvenile is well reminded by authority
that these are the rules within which h e must live."
It might be suggested that, accepting the fore-
going analysis, there is some conduct which, when
committed by juveniles, is peculiarly serious con-
duct by virtue of the age group and hence specially
in need of authoritarian treatment. Examples that
spring readily to mind are the juvenile drinking
in a bar, or habitually truant, or visiting a prosti-
tute. Should qualifications be made to the "viola-
tion of law" formulation by making special laws
for juvenile conduct?
A virtue of a theory that juveniles may only be
adjudicated delinquent for conduct which, if
committed by an adult, would constitute a vio-
lation of law has been seen as an insurance that
delinquent conduct will be conduct that the com-
munity views inimical as conduct, and not as
peculiarly dangerous because of the nature of the
actor apart from its manifestation in the conduct.
The community may, of course, be wrong in its
evaluation; the delinquency definition suggested
can be no better than the laws of the community.
6 TABER, THE VALUE OF CASEWORK TO THE PRO-
BATIONER, 1940, NAT'L PROB. AND PAROLE Ass'N.
YRBK., 167.
A wholesale concession to the view that laws
specially relating to juvenile conduct should be
made would, of course, place us back in the same
position as we are in at present; such a concession
would be inartistic as well because provisions of
the criminal code would stipulate "no juvenile
shall" and the juvenile court statute would state
that juveniles violating the criminal code shall
not be held subject to the criminal court but shall
be amenable only to the process of the criminal
court. It would be more artistic, then, to have
matters as they are than to make a wholesale
concession; the end result would be the same.
Concessions are not to be made, then, to special
juvenile laws of the generalized course of conduct
type ("waywardness", "incorrigibility", etc.) nor
to the balance of the specific terms of the Illinois
statute (running away from home; wandering on
the streets in the night time or about railroad yards
anytime; vulgar language, etc.); the foregoing has
suggested that such conduct should be treated
instead by community welfare agencies. What
about juvenile conduct such as drinking in a bar
or visiting a prostitute that violates fundamental
moral taboos of the community? I would be in-
clined not to let such exceptions be made to the
principal of uniformity of substantive norms for
adults and juveniles. The fear, of course, is that
in opening the door to these moral taboos it be-
comes difficult to exclude others; many of the
specific terms of the Illinois statute reflect but
differing degrees of "corruption". There is better
foundation, it may be conceded, for allowing ex-
ceptions in the cases of juvenile drinking and pros-
titute visitation; community interests are adversely
affected by the conduct itself since a drunken
citizenry is prone to reckless conduct and a prosti-
tute visiting citizenry will spread venereal disease.
The theoretical answer is that such conduct is
thus inimical whether committed by juveniles or
adults, and hence the community may only claim
such interests consistently if it has laws applicable
to juveniles and adults alike; the practical answers
are that the community can prevent juveniles
from these "corruptions" by special laws applica-
ble to bartenders and prostitutes doing business
with juveniles and that such juveniles can, where
proper subjects, be treated by welfare agencies of
the community. I would, however, allow a quali-
fication to the principle of uniformity of norms by
allowing truancy laws. The community has an
interest in an educated citizenry, and compulsory
[Vol. 48
JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION
school attendance laws would seem to aid this
interest by insuring at least a nominal education for
many who would otherwise not receive one. Tru-
ancy laws are another area where community
action, here in the form of special school programs
for truants with learning difficulties, would seem
in the final analysis most effective, 5 but the legal
condition of compulsory school attendance would
seem a necessary support to such programs.
One other qualification to these principles should
here be suggested. There would seem to be no
reason for juvenile court jurisdiction over traffic
law violators other than those whose persistent
violations reflect personality problems and dis-
regard for authority that may more beneficially
be handled by the juvenile courts than by the
adult courts.56 For such minor traffic violators,
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court would not
seem necessary and such problems could expedi-
tiously be handled by regular traffic courts.Y
X. EXCEPTIONS TO JUVENILE COURT
JURISDICTION IN CASES OF
SERIOUS CRIMES
Although the delinquency jurisdiction of the
juvenile courts is sweeping in its inclusion of much
behavior that is not violative of the criminal code,
offenses of the most serious nature, at least where
committed by persons of the upper degrees of
juvenile court age, typically are excluded from
juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction. In some
jurisdictions, this condition is a result of legisla-
tive enactment; in others, the courts, often by
processes of statutory and constitutional construc-
tion, have carved away exclusive jurisdiction from
the juvenile courts in cases where it seems to have
been clearly intended by the legislature.
The present legal pattern in the United States
may be sketched as follows. 6" In one jurisdiction,
Texas, all juveniles of juvenile court age (ten to
seventeen) are excluded from criminal court
jurisdiction, regardless of their offense. In eight
jurisdictions, although not all juvenile court ages
65 ELIOT, Should Courts Do Casework?, 60 SURVEY 601
(1928); See, for an account of a program of this kind,
RUBIN, op. cit. supra, note 8, 431.
66See U. S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, Standards for
Specialized Courts, D-2 and 3 (1953). Statutes in at
least two states provide that minor traffic violations
shall not be deemed delinquent conduct. N. J. STAT.
ANN. 2A: 4-14 (1956 Sup.); IDAHO, LAWS OF 1955,
e. 259, Sect. 3, p. 603.
67 Ibid.
6The data here presented is derived from LUDWIG,
YoUH ANm THE LAW, table, 30-36, (1955).
are exempted from criminal court jurisdiction,
-criminal court jurisdiction is excluded for juveniles
under varying ages between thirteen and sixteen.6 9
In seven jurisdictions, the juvenile court has
original and exclusive jurisdiction for all juvenile
court ages, but may waive jurisdiction to the
criminal court either in all cases or in special
categories of cases.7° In all other jurisdictions,
regardless of the age of the offender, the criminal
court has either concurrent jurisdiction (in which
case it may take jurisdiction if it so chooses)
over all cases or over specified categories of serious
cases, and/or exclusive jurisdiction over specified
categories of serious cases. The categories of speci-
fied serious crimes for which exceptions to juvenile
court jurisdiction are typically made are capital
crimes, crimes punishable by life imprisonment,
rape or attempt to commit rape, "infamous
crimes", and, sometimes, all crimes for which a
penitentiary sentence may be imposed. Some
jurisdictions will exclude only capital crimes;
others will exempt capital crimes and those punish-
able by life imprisonment; others will exclude all
of the specified categories.
Although legislatures have usually made ex-
ceptions to exclusive jurisdiction in the juvenile
court in cases of the most serious crimes, the courts
have typically shown an eagerness to carve ex-
ceptions to exclusive juvenile court jurisdiction,
or to widen the scope of legislatively created ex-
ceptions beyond proportions designed by the
legislature. A complete review of the cases in this
field is not here attempted, but a survey of some
of the leading cases should illustrate the techniques
the courts have used to exclude jurisdiction over
categories of serious crimes from the juvenile
court.
A first category of cases shows the courts not
carving out new categories of exceptions to juvenile
court jurisdiction but diluting the effect of ex-
clusive jurisdiction in areas where it has been con-
ferred. Thus courts have narrowly construed grants
of exclusive jurisdiction by decisions holding that
a juvenile defendant in a criminal prosecution
must himself plead the question of age, in lieu of
which an objection to criminal court jurisdiction
on the ground of age is deemed waivedY' Such
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proceedings would seem to imply that the question
was simply "another technicality" and would seem
oblivious to the policy as. -'..a. that the state
has shown an interest in not having children
treated as criminals by creating exclusive juvenile
court jurisdiction over certain ages. 72 A majority
of courts have held, emasculating the meaning of
exclusive juvenile court jurisdiction over specified
ages of offenders, that even though a defendant was
of juvenile court age at the time he committed the
act, he may be tried in the criminal court upon
passing the juvenile court age.73 Indeed, one court
has held, after invalidating a premature conviction
of a person of juvenile court age at the time of his
original conviction, that a re-conviction for the
same act upon his reaching criminal court age was
valid. 74
The second group of cases shows the courts
carving out new exceptions to exclusive juvenile
court jurisdiction bestowed by the legislature.
Two general techniques have been used here:
first, the courts have held grants of exclusive
jurisdiction to the juvenile courts unconstitutional
under state constitutions; second, by a process of
sometimes very tortured statutory construction,
they have found that when the legislature said
that juvenile courts shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion it did not really mean exclusive jurisdiction..
The constitutional method seems to have been
used wherever possible since it is easier to say that
a legislature could not mean what it said than to
say that it did not mean what it said. The "when-
ever possible" part of this formula seems to have
been supplied where criminal courts have been
established by the constitution, rather than by the
legislature, and juvenile courts have been estab-
lished by the legislature. Three recent Georgia
cases illustrate this process: in one, a sixteen year
old was convicted by a criminal court for murder;75
in another, a negro sixteen years old was sentenced
to electrocution for rape of a white female;76 in a
third, a criminal court convicted a fourteen year
old for manslaughter.1 The Georgia juvenile
court law explicitly conferred original exclusive
2 Ibid.
73 Ibid. See also the numerous cases cited in 123 ALR
446 (1939) and 48 ALR 2d 665 (1956).
11 Ibid.
7 Jones v. Balkcoin, 210 Ga. 689, 82 S.E. 2d 657
(1954).
76Jackson v. Balkcom, 210 Ga. 412, 80 S.E. 2d 319
(1954).
17Armstrong v. State, 90 Ga. App. 173, 82 S.E. 2d
51 (1954).
jurisdiction to the juvenile court in all cases in-
volving offenders of these ages, with the juvenile
court having power to waive jurisdiction in any
case in which it deemed waiver appropriate.
However, using a provision in the Georgia Consti-
tution specifying that the "superior court shall
have exclusive jurisdiction.. .in criminal cases
where the offender is subjected to loss of life or
confinement in the penitentiary. . ."3, the court
found exclusive original jurisdiction in the juvenile
court an unconstitutional usurpation of the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the criminal court in "crimi-
nal cases" of the above order conferred by the
constitution. The obvious answer to the Georgia
court would seem to be that cases tried in the
juvenile court are not "criminal cases where the
offender is subjected to loss of life or confinement
in the penitentiary" and that exclusive original
jurisdiction with power to waive was given to the
juvenile court so that it could determine whether
the case was to be a criminal case where the de-
fendant was subject to such penalties. Surely, if
the court had had any respect for the presumption
of constitutionality or the juvenile court laws'
grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the juvenile
court, it would have so held. The court, however,
carved a wide exception to the exclusive original
jurisdiction given to the juvenile court. As a result,
the juvenile court in Georgia now has discre-
tionary power to transfer jurisdiction to the crimi-
nal court in all cases where a penitentiary sen-
tence may be rendered, but no power to withhold
jurisdiction from the criminal court.79 The pro-
tective power of the juvenile court is thereby
taken away in all such cases. Cases involving a
carving of exceptions to exclusive original juris-
diction in the juvenile court by a process of statu-
tory interpretation need not be reviewed here;
in some, there was genuine ambiguity in the
juvenile court statute or were other statutory pro-
visions in conflict with the juvenile court code; 80
in others, a process of tortured construction has
been used that is consistent only with an interpre-
tation of hostility to the juvenile court laws.81
71 Ga. Const., art. 6, Sect. 4, Code Ann. Sect. 2-3901.
72 In People z. Lattimore 362 Ill. 206, 199 N.E. 275
(1935) (murder) and People v. Lewris 362 IIl. 229, 199
N.E. 276 (1935) (larceny) the Illinois court reached
the same result by a similar method of statutory con-
struction. See approving commentary in 247 JoutN.
Cain. L. 448 and critical commentary in 25 Ill. Bar J.
77.
so See St. v. McCoy, 145 Neb. 750. 18 N.W. 2d 101
(1945); St. v. Burnett 179 N.C. 735, 102 S.E. 711 (1920).
81 See People ex rel Cruz v. Morley 77 Cols 25, 234
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It would be misleading to imply that all state
appellate courts have shown hostility to legisla-
tive grants of exclusive jurisdiction to the juvenile
courts. Louisiana courts have held that where the
juvenile court statute gives it exclusive jurisdiction
over all but capital cases, that a criminal court
does not have jurisdiction on a murder indictment
to convict for manslaughter.8 2 New York courts
have held that where the juvenile courts have
exclusive jurisdiction for all but capital cases,
that a felony-murder conviction cannot be obtained
since the independent felony could not exist by
virtue of the fact that the independent felony was
not a capital crime.8 And a recent New Jersey
case, St. v. Monahan" seems to have over-ruled
In Re Mei,85 which had held, despite a statutory
stipulation that a person under sixteen was in-
capable of conimitting a crime, that a fifteen year
old could be convicted of murder.
As a matter of judicial policy the courts are
obliged by first principles of separation of powers
to follow the legislative design. The policy question
here, then, is primarily a legislative choice. What
policy should the legislature follow in determining
which, if any, crimes shall be exempted from ex-
clusive original jurisdiction? Should this exclusive
original jurisdiction include a power to waive
jurisdiction, and if so, when should such a power
to waive be granted?
A basic premise underlying the establishment of
Pac. 178 (1925,. The court here read the statutory
provision "juvenile courts shall have co-ordinate juris-
diction in any criminal case of the people versus or
concerning any person under 21 ... (and) ... exclu-
sive jurisdication ... in all cases concerning delinquent
children" (defined as children 18 and under violating
the law). The court here read the first part of the pro-
vision (co-ordinate jurisdiction) but not the latter part
of the provision i.exclusive jurisdiction), and thus failed
to harmonize the two parts to realize their obvious im-
pact of exclusive jurisdiction for children 18 and under
and co-ordinate jurisdiction for minors between 19
and 21.
82St. v. Ioward 126 La. 353, 52 So. 539 (1910); St.
t. West 173 La. 974. 139 So. 304 (1932); St. v. Bedford
193 La. 104, 190 So. 347 (1939). Cases contra in other
jurisdictions include: Collins v. Robbins, 147 Me. 163,
84 A2d 536 (1951); Howland v. State 151 Tenn. 47. 268
S.W. 115 (1924); Hinkle v. Skeen 138 W. Va. 116; 75
S.E. 2d 223 (1953).
8Peo. r. Roper. 259 N. Y. 170, 181 N.E. 88 (1932);
Peo. v. Porter 54 N. Y. S. 2d 3 (1945, Co. Ct.).
15 N. J. 34, 104 A2d 21 (1954).
85 122 N. J. Eq. 125, 192 A. 80 (1937). The Monehan
case was a felony-murder case, whereas the Mei case
was a premeditation and deliberation case. It seems
possible that the M'ei premeditation and deliberation
situation may be sni generis, although the Monahan
court did not explicitly qualify its rejection of .Mei.
juvenile court jurisdiction is that the juvenile
courts are better equipped to deal with the juvenile
law violator than are the criminal courts. 6 The
juvenile courts, because of their informal proceed-
ings, are likely to protect the young offender from
the traumatic aspects of a criminal court trial; on
disposition of a delinquency adjudication, where
institutionalization is to be required (as it typically
will be in cases of the most serious violations) the
juvenile is sent to an institution for juveniles and
thereby avoids the danger of exposure to adult
criminals; he is afforded a somewhat less peniten-
tiary-like environment than would be obtained in
an adult prison. It has been seen that the broadness
of the delinquency definition gives juvenile courts
jurisdiction over youths whose acts do not con-
travene state or municipal laws: to this extent,
juvenile court jurisdiction has, instead of serving
the function of protecting juveniles from criminal
court jurisdiction, exposed them to authoritarian
treatment that they would not otherwise have
received. Where, on the other hand, juvenile courts
are denied jurisdiction over acts that constitute
violations of the criminal law, they are denied
their protective purpose. The only supervening
interest that may be conceived of as justifying
this denial of juvenile court jurisdiction must be
the social interest of crime prevention; where this
justification is employed to deny the juvenile court
of jurisdiction the underlying assumption must be
that the criminal court is better equipped to per-
form this role of crime prevention than is the
juvenile court. The question, then, is when, if
ever, a criminal court is better equipped to fulfill
the purpose of crime prevention than is the juve-
nile court.
One fundamental limitation on the juvenile
court's powers of disposition is that it can exert
its power over the offender only during his mi-
nority.1' For it to purport to direct action over the
individual beyond his minority would seem to be
unconstitutional, since the rationale used for its
constitutional authority is that it is acting in the
86 Commenting on the establishment of the Illinois
juvenile court, V. A. LEONARD says: "The great con-
cern at the time was to get children out of jails as well
as out of Criminal Courts." 40 J. CRIM. L. 618 (1950).
See, to the same effect. MAcK, The Juvenile Court, 23
HARv. L. REv. 104 (1909).
87 Juvenile court statutes so provide. BURNS INO.
ANN. STATS., Sect. 9-3216 (1956); Cal. W. and I. Code




non-punitive capacity of parens patriae. A power
to institutionalize for longer than minority would,
under the judicially accepted theory of parens
patriae, seem a criminal -. nt and hence
unconstitutional.
If the juvenile court is impotent to institutiona-
lize for longer than minority, it would seem that
in some cases the social interest of crime preven-
tion would require jurisdiction in a court with
power to institutionalize for longer than minority,
i.e. the criminal court. The problem, then, is one
of drawing a line. The line drawn by the United
States Children's Bureau in its publication "Stand-
ards for Specialized Courts"8 9 seems a sensible
one. Under the view of the Children's Bureau, the
juvenile court should have original and exclusive
jurisdiction, but in cases of juveniles over sixteen
charged with felonies it can waive jurisdiction
where the minor "is not feeble-minded or insane
and is not treatable in any institution or facility
of the state designed for the care and treatment of
children, or where the court finds that the safety
of the community clearly requires that the child
continue under restraint for a period extending
beyond his minority." 90 Note, first, that contrary
to the prevailing law in this country, juveniles
sixteen and under, regardless of their offense, must
be tried in the juvenile court. At least three con-
siderations justify this approach. As a rule of
thumb, juveniles sixteen and under would seem to
have some potential for rehabilitation; this poten-
tial is best protected by preventing institutionali-
zation in an adult penitentiary. Further, even
lacking such potential, the inhumanity of sentenc-
ing children of this age group to a system where
they are subject to physical and psychological
buse by older inmates requires their segregation
rom adult criminals. Finally, if such juveniles are
ncorrigible and constitute a dangerous threat to
ociety, in many cases they will commit acts in
he juvenile institution after reaching the age of
eventeen that may place them within the juris-
iction of the criminal court. Second, note that
all felonies where the offender is over sixteen
nd of juvenile court age, the juvenile court and
ot the criminal court has power to determine
hether he shall be tried in the criminal court;
irther, the conditions under which the juvenile
,urt may waive jurisdiction are defined and pre-
88 See Petition of Morin, 95 N. H. 518, 68 A2d 668
948) and cases cited therein.
39 P. D-4.
90Ibid.
sumably a waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile
court would be reviewable on an appellate chal-
lenge to criminal court jurisdiction. This system
would seem to resolve the competing considerations
inherent in the problem as well as may be expected.
XI. JURISDICTION IN CASES OF DEPENI)ENCY AND
NEGLECT
Dependency jurisdiction 'and neglect jurisdic-
tion,9' unlike delinquency jurisdiction, have not
been analyzed as being necessarily founded on the
protection of the social interest of crime prevention
but can be explained by the parens patriae theory.
Does it necessarily follow, however, that the court
is the agency of the state best suited to perform
this parental role?
If the special qualifications of the court may be
accepted as being in resolving controversies of
fact and in applying provisions of law to render
authoritative orders for the state or private per-
sons,2 the reasons for the court's assumption of
jurisdiction in cases where the need is simply for
aid, as is usually the case in dependency jurisdic-
tion and frequently the case in neglect jurisdiction,
may be explained only on historical grounds.
Founded at the turn of the century when non-court
agencies for aid to needy children were unde-
veloped, the court was a convenient instrument
for centralizing juvenile aid.9 But the passage of
the Social Security Act in 1935 authorized the
expenditure of federal funds "for public assistance
to various groups of dependent persons, including
children, and for assistance to state public welfare
agencies 'in establishing, extending, and strength-
ening, especially in predominantly rural areas,
public welfare services for the protection and care
of homeless, dependent, and neglected children,
and children in danger of becoming delinquent.' "94
As the result of this legislation, today every state
has established a state public welfare agency. 95
These state welfare agencies, as well as independent
community welfare agencies, provide a ready
mechanism today for the administration of the
91 See Appendix.
92 ELIOT, Casework Functions and Judicial Functions,
1937 NAT'L PRoB. Ass'N YRsBx., 253. Eastman and
Cousins, Juvenile Court and Welfare Agency, 38 A.B.A.J.
575 (1952).
93 Nurr, The Responsibility of the Juv. Ct. and the
Public Welfare Agency in the Child Welfare Program,
1947 NAT'L. PROn. AND PAROLE Ass'N. YRBc., 207.
94 Ibid., at 208.
95 Ibid. In 1932, three years before the passage of




disposition of dependent and neglected children.
Their personnel, unlike that of the court, is
specially trained for welfare work and it would
seem a more sensible allocation of functions to
designate the placement of children to personnel
trained for this work.
There are, moreover, dangers in the court's
assumption of jurisdiction over dependent and
neglected children. Under the terms of many
juvenile court statutes, children adjudicated de-
pendent or neglected are subject to the same dis-
positions as are delinquent children.96 Too fre-
quently, communities do not have special dwellings
for dependent and neglected children, and many
of them, "young in age, are indiscriminately
thrown together in detention homes with older
delinquents," 7 sent to the same foster homes as
delinquent children, and indeed a few are even
committed to the same institutions as delinquent
children.8 Frequently, dependent and neglected
children are placed under probationary super-
vision; 99 the motive, no doubt, is to provide them
with care and guidance, but why this task should
be assumed under the auspices of the court by
probation officers who all too frequently lack
qualification for their jobs is by no means ap-
parent. These dangers could be appreciably amelio-
rated by legislation at least prohibiting the de-
tention and placement of dependent and neglected
children in homes or institutions where delinquent
children are kept, and should further be amelio-
rated by legislative requirement that casework for
dependent and neglected children be done outside
the court. Even such legislation, however, might
in some cases be ineffective, for just as prohibitions
against the detention of delinquent children in
jail are frequently ignored by the courts, so too
might these provisions be ignored. Where such
facilities are close at hand to the court, it might be
all too disposed to use them.
The fundamental problem, of course, is the
96 See, not stipulating that dependent and neglected
children shall not be sent to the same institution: CODE
OF ALA., title 13, Sect. 361 (although it is stipulated
that whites and negroes shall not be sent to the same
institution); ARIZ. REv. STAT. Am. c. 2, Sect. 8-231;
MICHIOAN STATS. ANN., Sect. 27, 3178 (598.18). But see,
stipulating that dependent and neglected children shall
not be sent to the same institution as delinquent chil-
dren: ARK. STATS. ANN. Title 45, c. 221 (1947); SmiTH-
HURD ILL. ANN. STATS., c. 23, Sect. 196 (1952); PUR-
DON'S PENN. STATS., Title 11, Sect. 253 (1953).
97 U. S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, op. cit. supra, note 42.
98 RUBIN, op. cit. supra, note 8, at 427.
99 RUBIN, op. cit. supra, note 8, at 426.
development of adequate community resources for
the placement of dependent and neglected chil-
dren. 0 As long as these are not available, de-
pendent and neglected children will be detained
or placed in sub-standard dwellings; where they
are available, the juvenile court typically makes
use of them. But at least, it seems safe to assume,
the social welfare agencies would be able to find
some facilities other than detention homes and
institutions for delinquents.
In some neglect cases, authoritative action is
necessary against the parents and court action is
clearly justified here.' But the helpfulness of such
authority over the parent is doubtful. It is difficult
to appreciate that a culpable parent would be
transformed into a good parent simply by virtue
of a court order;'0 2 again, the fundamental problem
would appear to be the development of adequate
community resources for the care of the child.
Court jurisdiction is certainly needed for the pro-
tection of parental rights in cases where the right to
custody of the parent is involved because of de-
pendency or neglect.9 3 Jurisdiction over such
matters may be specifically conferred without the
unnecessary and frequently harmful consequences
of blanket jurisdiction over the child in cases of
dependency and neglect.
XII. CONCLUSION
An intelligent formulation of the purposes of
juvenile court jurisdiction requires an apprecia-
tion of the court's limitations, liabilities, and
special qualifications. A recognition of the fact
that the court is not specially qualified to do social
welfare work and of the fact that its attempt to do
such work in cases of dependency and neglect
creates risks for the child of detention and foster
home placement with delinquent children would
dictate that is be divested of jurisdiction where the
child's need is simply for aid. Vesting the court with
delinquency jurisdiction in cases where the juve-
nile's conduct has not violated the social norms
defined by state, county, and municipal laws rests
upon a failure to appreciate the dangers of un-
justified authoritarian treatment involved, and
upon the mistaken assumptions that such conduct
199 NuTT, Jui'enile and Domestic Rdations Courts,
1947 SOCIAL WORK YEARBOOK, 271.
lot NUTT, JUVENILE COURT FuNcno-% 1942 NT'L
PROB. Ass'N YRBK., 94.
102 RUBIN, op. cit. supra, note 8, at 429-30.
'03 MEAD, The Juvenile Court and Child Welfare
Service, 1947 NT'L PROB. A.D PAROLE ASs', YRBK.,
224.
19581
